Outcome of Accelerated Misconduct Hearing - PC Sarah Bromfield

Misconduct Hearing

Officers name:               PC Sarah Bromfield

Date of the hearing:          23^rd July 2026

Time of the hearing:          09.30

The place at which the hearing took place: The Professional Standards Department, Sheffield.

A description of the alleged conduct:

After being notified of, and acknowledging, a lawful order in March 2025 not to associate with an individual, it is alleged that in March 2026 the officer was in company with said individual at Manchester Crown Court.

This is a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in respect of Honesty and Integrity (Integrity Only) and Orders and Instructions.

The matters set out above are breaches of the Standards which are so serious as to justify dismissal and therefore constitute gross misconduct.

The Chair found that the former officer breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour in respect of these allegations and that the breaches amounted to gross misconduct.

The outcome of the hearing was that the officer was dismissed without notice. He will also be added to the College of Policing Barred List.

 

IN THE MATTER OF AN ACCELERATED MISCONDUCT HEARING

IN THE MATTER OF THE POLICE CONDUCT REGULATIONS 2020

 

RE: PC 259 SARAH BROMFIELD

 

_______________________________________

 

DETERMINATION OF
CHIEF CONSTABLE POULTNEY

_______________________________________

 

1. This is my determination in the accelerated misconduct proceedings related to PC 259 Sarah Bromfield.

Representation

 

2. The Appropriate Authority was represented by DCI Jo Kemp and the Investigating Officer DS Jill Rankin was in attendance. The Officer was in attendance for the hearing and was not represented by the Federation but supported by her welfare officer Vicky Green.

 

Preliminary matters

3. In advance of the Accelerated Misconduct Hearing a number of preliminary issues were raised which required my determination.

 

Reporting restriction notifiable association

4. At the outset of the hearing, I made a direction that there would be no public reporting of the identity of the notifiable association at the centre of the allegations, XXXXXX. I considered that it was not necessary nor in the public interest for this individual’s name to be revealed as it has no bearing on the allegations themselves. For the avoidance of doubt, I directed that all subsequent reporting in respect of this hearing, including this document shall redact his identity.

 

The Equality Act 2010/reasonable adjustments

5. It was confirmed at the beginning of the hearing that all efforts had been made to ensure that any reasonable adjustments were made to ensure the Officer’s fair participation in this hearing. It was confirmed to the Officer that extra time and breaks would be afforded to her if she required, as well as her being permitted to refer to her written notes throughout the duration of the hearing. She confirmed that there were no further reasonable adjustments which could be made to assist her participation.

 

Additional evidence from both sides

6. During the course of the hearing, I received written submissions on behalf of the Officer which made certain factual assertions about the chronology of events. In response to this I received further evidence in the form of two witness statements (Joanne Turner dated 18/03/2025 and Samantha Newton dated 15/09/2025) as well as a copy of emails between PSD and the Officer from August - October 2024 which I had not previously seen. I considered the relevance of this evidence, and the fact that the Officer was provided ample opportunity to consider this additional evidence and subsequently make any representations she sought to in response before making any decision in this matter. I considered that the additional evidence was relevant to my decision making and as such was content for it to be included with the information for my consideration as to the facts of the allegations and breach, in light of the fact that there would be no prejudice to the Officer by virtue of her having been able to consider it and respond to the same within the hearing.

 

Allegations

7. The Officer was served with a Notice of Accelerated Misconduct Hearing proceedings outlining one allegation, which if proven, was assessed as amounting to gross misconduct. The allegation was:

PC Bromfield, it is alleged that you breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour contrary to Regulation 5 and Schedule 2 of The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (as amended) in that:

 

1. On 27 February 2025, the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police authorised several Risk Mitigation Measures in relation to you, including the lawful order that you were not to associate with XXXXXX.

 

1. On 3 March 2025, you were notified by the Professional Standards Department via email of the Risk Mitigation Measures, including the lawful order that you were not to associate with XXXXXX.

 

1. On 10 March 2025, you acknowledged the Risk Mitigation Measures email from Professional Standards.

 

It is alleged that you breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour in that:

On 9 March 2026, at Manchester Crown Court, you were in company of XXXXXX.

The above conduct breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour relating to Discreditable Conduct, Honesty and Integrity (Integrity only) and Orders and Instructions which are so serious as to justify dismissal and therefore amounts to gross misconduct.

 

Burden and standard of proof

8. The burden of proof is on the Appropriate Authority to prove that the Officer behaved in the manner alleged and that in doing so, she breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour. The standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. The Appropriate Authority must further satisfy me that the manner of the breach is of such a nature or degree that it amounts to gross misconduct. 

 

Officer’s response

9. The Officer has provided a Regulation 51 response confirming that she accepts the facts of the allegations (i.e. that she received the lawful order, that she acknowledged its receipt and that she was in the company of XXXXX on 9^th March 2026). The Officer does not accept that the allegations amount to gross misconduct and suggests that the matter ought not to have been referred to accelerated misconduct proceedings. The Officer argues that the evidence does not demonstrate a breach of the Honesty and Integrity Standard of Professional Behaviour. The Officer further points to evidence in respect of her health and welfare which she considers have not been sufficiently considered in the context of the allegation of gross misconduct and provides copies of a number of Occupational Health records dating back to 2014.

 

10. Before proceeding further, and for the avoidance of doubt, I make it clear that it is without my remit to make any determination on the appropriateness of the referral of this matter to an accelerated misconduct hearing. This is a matter for the AA alone. Notwithstanding this, I note that the Officer accepts the facts of the allegation in their entirety and as such I cannot see any prejudice to the Officer in proceeding in this manner. It remains a matter for me as to whether the Standards of Professional Behaviour have been breached and whether or not any proven breaches constitute gross misconduct.

 

Determination of conduct

11. In making my determination in relation to the alleged misconduct, I have assessed all relevant information made available to me in the hearing bundle and at the hearing today. I have considered all representations made on behalf of the AA, and the Officer. I have also utilised the relevant sections of the College of Policing Document ‘Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings’ in formulating the rationale for my determination.

 

12. Before making my determination, I reminded myself of the definition of gross misconduct as prescribed by Regulation 2.

 

13. I find the facts of the allegation proven. There is incontrovertible evidence which is accepted by the Officer that on 3^rd March 2025 she was made subject to a lawful order which amongst other things stated in bold: “there can be NO association with XXXXXX”. The Officer acknowledged receipt of the lawful order by way of email on 10^th March 2025. I am entirely satisfied that the CCTV footage of which there are screenshots contained within the bundle shows the Officer in company with XXXXXX at Manchester Crown Court on 9^th March 2026 in contravention of the lawful order (indeed this is also accepted by the Officer).

 

14. The Officer was keen to provide additional context to the factual allegations made by the AA and I can confirm that I have taken all of the information provided by her into consideration when undertaking my deliberations on breach, even where specific pieces of information are not referenced within this decision.

 

15. In light of the additional information provided by the Officer at the hearing today and that provided by the AA in response, it was confirmed with the Officer in the hearing that by way of context of the allegations, the following chronology was accurate:

 

1. On 18^th December 2023 the Officer submitted an NA report indicating that she was on “nodding terms” with XXXXXX;
2. On 9^th June 2024 the Officer was told she must update any change of the status of the relationship;
3. On 22^nd October 2024 the Officer submitted an update that XXXXXX had been released from prison and their relationship had become intimate;
4. On 24^th October 2024 there was a risk mitigation meeting with DI Sam Newton, ADS Jo Turner and Rachel Rawlings. At that meeting the Officer was given a DVDS disclosure and indicated that she needed to consider her “exit plan”;
5. On 29^th October 2024 there was a meeting with the FVM, Jayne Forrest, ADS Turner and DI Newton. In this meeting the Officer stated that she had told XXXXXX that the relationship must end, and acknowledged that she was attracted to his “bad boy image” and that he was attracted to the fact that she was a police officer. There was a discussion about how to safely end the relationship and the Officer was told her vetting was at risk and that she must have no contact with XXXXXX;
6. In November 2024 the Officer was arrested and one of the subsequent bail conditions was not to have contact with XXXXXX. The Officer stated that she adhered to that condition but she resumed contact with XXXXXX once the condition was no longer in place.
7. On 3^rd March 2025 the Officer was emailed a lawful order to not have contact with XXXXXX which she acknowledged on 10^th March;
8. The Officer did not provide any update about the status of her relationship with XXXXXX since the meeting on 29^th October 2024.

 

16. In respect of the Standards of Professional Behaviour there can be no doubt that such a flagrant disregard of a lawful order constitutes a breach of the Orders and Instructions Standard.

 

17. I also find that by continuing to associate with XXXXXX despite the very clear lawful order not to do so, the Officer has compromised her position, as specified within the wording of the Honesty and Integrity Standard, thus breaching the same. I also find that the Officer acted without integrity by continuing the relationship with XXXXXX despite being fully aware of the risks associated with this, including in relation to the force’s reputation by virtue of two in-person meetings which took place in October 2024. For the avoidance of doubt, the AA did not assert that the Officer had acted in any way dishonestly, and I make no findings that she has.

 

18. I further find that in deciding to continue her association with XXXXX despite her knowledge that this was in direct contravention of the lawful order the Officer has behaved in a manner which would discredit the police service and undermine public confidence in it. The public are entitled to expect that police officers will have respect for lawful orders designed to ensure the proper undertaking of their duties and protection of the public and further that they will not carry out inappropriate relationships with individuals who themselves have committed crimes and who have the potential to compromise the Officer’s position within the force.

 

19. The Officer relies upon the fact that she was open and honest with the force regarding her relationship with XXXXXX as a factor which reduces her culpability in this case, and consequently the severity of the breach. In light of the information provided by her and her acceptance of the chronology as set out at paragraphs 15a-h above, I consider that after 29^th October 2024 there was in fact a wholesale failure on the part of the Officer to update the force about the status of her relationship with XXXXXX. The last information provided by the Officer in respect of the relationship was at the meeting on 29^th October 2024 in which the force fully explained the risks to her, the force and her vetting status of continuing the relationship, and as a consequence of which she confirmed that she would end the relationship. It now transpires from the information provided by the Officer, that from this point she failed to end the relationship, and in fact continued this to the present day, becoming engaged in August 2025, something which she never updated the force in respect of.

 

20. I note that at the time of the two meetings in October 2024, the Officer’s relationship was neither long-term or committed and was in fact referred to by her as “an autumn fling”. Whilst the Officer relies upon the long-term and committed nature of the relationship to provide mitigation in respect of her actions, I consider the fact that the Officer made the decision to continue the relationship rather than end it when the initial advice was given and after the lawful order being made significantly undermines her argument in this regard. The relationship only developed into a committed and long-term one by virtue of the Officer breaching the already imposed lawful order.

 

21. I consider the seriousness of this matter to be increased by virtue of the fact that the Officer breached the lawful order having had two in-person meetings during which the risks to herself, the force including the reputation of the force and her vetting status of continuing the relationship were explained at great length to her.

 

22. The Officer also points to the fact that the lawful order was made in respect of a committed long-term relationship and as such constituted an interference with her Article 8 rights.

 

23. Whilst the Officer appears to accept the lawfulness of the order in the first instance, I am entirely satisfied that the lawful order was a necessary and proportionate interference with the Officer’s right to a private and family life, with the legitimate aim of ensuring public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime. I also note that the Police Act 2003 specifically legislates for the interference in the private lives of police officers in respect of any activity “which is likely to interfere with the impartial discharge or his duties or which is likely to give rise to the impression amongst members of the public that it may so interfere” (Schedule 1, Police Act 2003). There are clear risks to the integrity of police operations, the confidentiality of police information, the ability of the officer to undertake her role with impartiality and public perception arising from a police officer engaging in an intimate relationship with a convicted criminal and being seen to support him at court in relation to further alleged offences. In my view whether or not that individual was ultimately convicted of offences is irrelevant in respect of the breach of the Standards and any severity of the same. Given the nature of the risks presented by XXXXXX, I find that a complete cessation of any association between the Officer and XXXXXX would have been the only proportionate measure to mitigate against those risks.

 

24. The Officer further suggests that the fact that the lawful order was connected to the Officer’s personal life as opposed to an operational matter reduces her culpability and/or the severity of the breach. I am not persuaded by this argument. Police officers are subject to the Standards of Professional Behaviour whether they are on or off duty, and in my view the consequences of breaching a lawful order connected to an Officer’s personal life can be just as serious or even more serious than those of breaching an operational lawful order.

 

25. I further find that the Officer’s culpability is increased in this case, by virtue of her long-service, and in particular her role within the Professional Standards Department. By virtue of this role there can be no doubt that the Officer would have been acutely aware of the risks of her actions and possible consequences of the same but continued with them regardless.

 

26. I have considered the supporting evidence provided alongside the Officer’s Regulation 54 response. I do not consider there to be a causal link between any of the Officer’s medical conditions or circumstances surrounding her fitness to work and her conduct, neither do I find that any of these matters reduce her culpability in any way. There is no medical evidence to suggest that the Officer’s conditions have any impact upon her judgment and/or decision-making abilities.

 

27. For the reasons I have given I find that the breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in this case are so serious as to justify dismissal and therefore amount to gross misconduct.

 

Determination of sanction

28. Having determined that the allegations were proven, and that the proven breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour constituted gross misconduct, I invited representations from the parties on the appropriate sanction in this matter.

 

29. Submissions were made by the Appropriate Authority that the appropriate outcome in this case is one of dismissal without notice.

 

30. I have taken into account what is said by the Officer in her Regulation 54 response and additional documentation as far as it relates to my determination on sanction, as well as the submissions made by her today. I have considered her Record of Service and the character references submitted on the Officer’s behalf.

 

31. South Yorkshire Police holds itself to the highest standards in respect of the rule of law, the Code of Ethics and the Standards of Professional Behaviour, but also the standards expected by every member of our community that the police will operate with a higher level of trust as it is their duty to protect people. When an officer compromises that, it is important that a full and thorough investigation occurs, and an appropriate sanction is imposed that helps to restore any lost trust and confidence.

 

32. Any action I take today has been to balance the Officer’s rights proportionately with the requirement to maintain public confidence, and the public interest that may be served by retaining an officer.

 

33. Having found earlier at stage one of proceedings that the proven misconduct constitutes gross misconduct, the outcomes available to me are:
34. To impose a final written warning;
35. To dismiss the officer without notice.

 

34. A reduction in rank is not possible in this case given the Officer’s substantive rank.

 

35. I considered these potential outcomes in order from the lowest sanction through to dismissal and assessed them as to how they may meet the need to fulfil the purposes of the misconduct proceedings, and the purpose of imposing sanctions.

 

 

36. By virtue of the allegations in this matter coming to the attention of the AA after the commencement of The Police (Conduct, Performance and Complaints and Misconduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 there is a presumption in this case that where a finding of gross misconduct is made, the Officer must be dismissed without notice unless I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which justify a lesser sanction.

 

 Seriousness

37. I have considered the seriousness of the misconduct that gave rise to the hearing today, in accordance with the College of Policing’s Guidance on Outcomes.

 

Culpability

38. I have considered the Officer’s culpability in this case and consider that the deliberate and intentional nature of the Officer’s actions despite her knowledge of the associated risks significantly increase her culpability in this case. In light of this and the matters outlined in my seriousness assessment at stage one I find the Officer’s culpability in this case to be

Harm

39. I have considered the harm (including the risk of harm as per the guidance in the case of Fuglers) in this case and make the following observations:
    1. The risk of harm to the integrity of police operations (and thus ultimately to members of the public), confidentiality of police information and the ability of the Officer to undertake her role impartially is significant in this case;
    2. There is also a clear and significant risk to public confidence in the force and the police service generally arising from the Officer’s actions. Being seen as a police officer, tasked with upholding the law and ensuring public safety to be in a committed relationship with an individual who has been convicted of crimes and continues to face further allegations of violent crimes is fundamentally incompatible with the values rightfully expected of officers by members of the public. Further, members of the public are entitled to expect that officers who are responsible for imposing and policing restrictions on their lives and liberty would abide by lawful orders imposed upon them.
40. I find, therefore, that the potential for harm in this case is high.

 

Aggravating Factors

41. I have carefully considered the aggravating factors listed within the Guidance and any other issues outside of those, and been careful not to double count them. I consider the following aggravating factors apply to this case:
    1. Deliberate nature of the behaviour;
    2. Sustained behaviour over a period of time;
    3. Continuing the behaviour after the Officer realised, or should have realised that it was improper;
    4. Significant deviation from instructions (lawful order).

 

Mitigating factors

42. I have carefully considered the mitigating factors listed within the Guidance and any other issues outside of those, and again been careful not to double count.

 

43. I accept that the Officer has expressed remorse and acceptance of responsibility for her actions, and I am grateful to the Officer for the apology proffered today. I do however consider that this is tempered by the fact that the Officer suggests today that she should have challenged the making of the order through the proper channels in the first instance, thus, in my view, demonstrating a continued lack of insight into the risks to the force both operationally and reputationally, and to her own ability to undertake her role impartially posed by her relationship with XXXXXX.

 

44. I have already found that there is no causal link between the conditions outlined in the occupational health reports provided by the Officer and her conduct and neither do I find that this information presents any mitigation as far as the misconduct itself was concerned.

 

Personal Mitigation

45. I have taken account of the decision in R (on the application of Williams) v Police Appeals Tribunal and another [2016] EWHC 2708 as to the weight to be given to personal mitigation in police misconduct proceedings.

 

46. I have taken into account the information provided by the Officer in respect of her medical conditions which I consider to constitute personal mitigation.

 

47. I have also considered the character references provided by the Officer.

 

48. In my view, because of the importance of maintaining public confidence in, and respect for the police service, the potential of any personal mitigation is necessarily limited. This is a case which significantly threatens the public’s confidence in, and respect for, the police service.

 

49. I take into account paragraph 4.74 of the Guidance on Outcomes as set out by the College of Policing which confirms that where gross misconduct has been found and the behaviour has caused – or could have caused – serious harm to individuals, the community and/or public confidence in the police service, dismissal is likely to follow.

 

50. I further remind myself of the presumption of dismissal where gross misconduct is found. I have considered whether exceptional circumstances exist justifying a departure from the presumption that dismissal without notice must follow a finding of gross misconduct and I find that there are none in this case.

 

51. For the reasons I have given it is my view that the only outcome which would be commensurate to the level of misconduct in this case and to sufficiently uphold public confidence in the police is dismissal without notice.

 

52. As a consequence of the above, I indicate that the Officer’s details should be included within the Police Barred List (Regulation 3(2) of the Police Barred List and Police Advisory List Regulations 2017).

 

53. I am aware of the Officer’s right to appeal in accordance with the Police Appeals Tribunal Rules 2020. The Officer should provide notice of her intention to appeal to the Appropriate Authority within 10-working days of receipt of this written determination.