4.

South Yorkshire Police can confirm that some information is held, but under the terms of Section 17 (1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I am not obliged to provide this information by virtue of the following exemptions
Section 30(2) (a)(i)(ii)&(b) - Investigations and Proceedings (Where the information specifically relates to the obtaining of information from confidential sources)
Section 38(1) - Health and Safety
Section 40(2) - Personal Information
In addition to outlining the exemptions relied upon I am also obliged to provide an explanation as to why those exemptions apply. Before doing so I think it worthwhile providing some background information regarding the Police Services use of informants.
Evidence of Harm
The information is only held because it is obtained and recorded by the force for the purpose of its functions in relation to criminal investigations.
In considering whether or not this information should be disclosed, I have considered the potential HARM that could be caused by such a disclosure. Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) (regardless of their motivation) provide information at particular personal risk to themselves and their families. As previous cases have shown, where CHIS are identified it can result in substantial physical harm, or mental trauma resulting from the threat of physical harm.
http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Sky-News-Archive/Article/200806413418676?f=rss
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-949766-the-met-yardies-and-rising-murder.do
http://www.ndsn.org/SEPOCT98/LAWENF3.html
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=4844484&page=1
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=950&dat=19860221&id=XxcMAAAAIBAJ&sjid=blkDAAAAIBAJ&pg=7013,1264919
This problem is particularly acute in cases relating to serious crime and terrorism where the threat against individuals is substantial.  The disclosure of information relating to the number of CHIS operating around the UK would allow those involved in serious and organised crime to identify particular activity within specific force areas and connect this knowledge to law enforcement activities which may have impacted upon their own criminal network.
The ICO have previously questioned the “chilling effect” in respect of the police services attitude to releasing informant information, however public articles such as the following are a clear indication that the public themselves have a similar view as to how informants are regarded by those seeking to protect their criminal activities and the risks that they face:
Informants are regarded as traitors by their former criminal associates. Whatever the nature of a group, it is bound to feel strong hostility towards any known informers, regard them as threats and inflict punishments ranging from social ostracism through physical abuse and/or death. Informers are therefore generally protected, either by being segregated while in prison or, if they are not incarcerated, relocated under a new identity – Wikipedia
This would be particularly relevant where an unusually high number of CHIS may have been used to provide information on a high profile or significant case, and is activity which would then be clearly identified through such a disclosure of information, particularly within a smaller force due to a peak in their data.  This would then be likely to result in gang members actively seeking to identify a CHIS within their organisation and subsequently using extreme violence against them for betraying their trust.
Exposing CHIS to public scrutiny would almost certainly compromise their right to privacy and a private life as defined in Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. Agreeing to become an informant is a major step of trust, based on the understanding that information is given in confidence and that anonymity will be preserved. Any disclosure which undermines the confidence of current and potential informants and the ability of law enforcement bodies to keep informant identities secret would be a major deterrent to potential informants. This would be likely to prejudice substantially the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders by reducing the flow of information to the police service and other agencies.

This request relates specifically to the number of Covert Human Intelligence Sources currently in receipt of payments from this Force together with "the amount paid to the highest CHIS/informant"I am assuming that the latter part of this section of the request refers to the largest payment made to a single Source during the current financial year, with a comparison to the previous financial year (as opposed to a reference to the pinnacle of some hierarchical order of sources). The publication of the single amount paid to any source would of itself provide sufficient corroboration to persons already in possession of other information, e.g. the use by a source of a cover story to mask his or her sudden acquisition of a sum of money. There is no doubt that such corroboration would considerably increase the risks to that source and lead to the targeting of him or her either with a view to taking immediate violent retribution or subjecting them to further investigation. In addition to the obvious personal risks to the source there also exists the risk of criminals using an identified source to feed misinformation in order to frustrate the efforts of the force in preventing and detecting crime. The release of numbers of sources on a year by year basis, even at Force level, would allow for the mapping, charting and comparison of police activity in this area year by year. Such activity could provide encouragement to relocate criminal activity to areas perceived to make relatively little use of this investigatory tool.

The use of CHIS is regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act which requires authorities to take into account the provisions of the Human Rights Act when using CHIS (and other covert techniques). Police forces are reminded of their obligation under Article 2 of the Human Rights Act which requires them to protect human life. This is further supported by a High Court hearing Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police. In this case the force concerned failed to provide adequate protection to an individual whose life was at risk because of the criminal acts of a third party. The witness was murdered by a person whom he was about to give evidence against in a criminal trial.
The use of informants, either paid or unpaid, is a key tool used by law enforcement bodies for gathering intelligence, and CHIS are often the most valuable sources of information, enabling the police and other agencies to secure evidence and subsequent prosecutions. Any disclosure that may reduce the flow of information to the police service and other agencies would have a substantial prejudicial impact on the ability of such authorities to collect reliable and accurate intelligence, and would result in them becoming dependant on more costly and time consuming methods of collecting intelligence.
Information relating to CHIS is protected during court proceedings and is viewed as sensitive material. In the majority of cases, information relating to CHIS will only be provided to a court on a sensitive disclosure schedule and is not generally considered in open court (unless it will directly assist the prosecution or aid the defence).
Public Interest Immunity (PII) is a principle of English common law under which the English courts can grant a court order allowing one litigant to refrain from disclosing evidence to the other litigants where disclosure would be damaging to the public interest. This is an exception to the usual rule that all parties in litigation must disclose any evidence that is relevant to the proceedings. In making a PII order, the court has to balance the public interest in the administration of justice (which demands that relevant material is available to the parties to litigation) and the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of certain documents whose disclosure would be damaging.
CHIS material will often also be subject to Public Interest Immunity, demonstrating that the courts recognise the there is little public interest in the open discussion of information relating to CHIS unless it is critical in a particular case or there is a public interest in disclosure. Even within the law enforcement community, information relating to the number of CHIS and their personal data is placed strictly on a 'need to know'.
All forces now proactively release annual data in respect of informant payments, and therefore to provide any additional information (exact numbers /specific ages/gender) of informants operating within a force area would reduce the level of confidentiality promised by the force and endorsed by society.
As previously mentioned, a formal inspection is already in place which specifically looks at CHIS operations within forces, and some (national) data and further comment on this activity is included within the following report:

http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1011/hc01/0168/0168.pdf

CHIS
4.8 There were 5,320 CHIS recruited by law enforcement agencies during the year; 4,495 were cancelled (including some who were recruited during the previous year) ; and 3,767 were in place at the end of March 2010. The figures for the previous year which were 4,278, 4,202 and 3,722 indicate a slight increase in usage.
4.9 During the current reporting year other public authorities recruited 229 CHIS of whom 182 were cancelled during the year with 90 in place on 31 March 2010.
During the previous year 234 were recruited, 153 cancelled and 106 were in place at the end of the year. Again just over half of CHIS usage was by government departments. The light use of RIPA/RIP(S)A powers by local authorities is even more pronounced in relation to CHIS recruitment. 97% recruited five or fewer and 86% did not use CHIS.

Sec 30 - Considerations favouring disclosure
The purpose of the Act is to make public authorities more accountable and this factor, therefore, may be applied to a wide range of scenarios from how an individual or the force fulfils their role or function, to policy decisions that have been taken in relation to investigations or general policy issues. In this instance, disclosure allows public scrutiny of specific information relating to CHIS and how forces use this resource within their investigative processes.
Disclosure of information can assist individuals by raising awareness of issues which may be of relevance to them. In this instance, there has been public concern about the use of CHIS by law enforcement bodies, and therefore the disclosure of this information would contribute to more accurate public debate, allowing the opportunity to correct speculation and falsehoods on the subject.
Where public funds are being spent, there is a public interest in accountability and justification in rewarding CHIS. Disclosure of this information would enlighten members of the public as to the number of CHIS being funded within their police area. This will promote better transparency and accountability where expenditure of public funds is concerned.
Where an investigation has been closed and proceedings completed, the disclosure of the information would no longer impact on that specific investigation.
Where particular prosecution cases may have collapsed due to procedural issues surrounding the use of informants, the disclosure of such information would assist to scrutinise areas of concern in order to establish better working practices.
Sec 30 - Considerations favouring non-disclosure
The use of informants is widely recognised as being involved in the specific purposes of obtaining information for live and current investigations. The release of any informant information during the process is likely to impede the police service’s ability to carry out an efficient and effective investigation.
Any disclosure which reveals the use or identity of an informant in a particular case would possibly lead to the collapse of a prosecution case in order to protect the CHIS. thereby hindering the prevention or detection of crime
The police service has undertaken substantial work in recent years in improving its CHIS handling process, resulting in successful prosecutions in high profile cases and strengthening its ability to attract future recruits by offering appropriate protection for those assisting the police service. The non disclosure of this information is necessary in maintaining confidential sources for future investigations.
The police service work with a number of other agencies, who also share the same resources and information, and the release of this information is likely to undermine the successful partnership approach in carrying out criminal investigations.
It is rare that details of an investigation will be disclosed as to do so will invariably release personal information, identify law enforcement techniques and in the case of uncompleted cases potentially damage the criminal justice process.
The current or future law enforcement role of the force may be compromised by the release of information, i.e. where the prevention/detection of crime, the apprehension/prosecution of offenders or the administration of justice may be hindered as a result of the release of information. Disclosure of the requested information would impact on the ability of police forces to gather valuable intelligence.
Sec 38 - Considerations favouring disclosure
The release of the information would not lead to any significant risk to a CHIS or the investigative process.
Where public funds are being spent, there is a public interest in accountability and justification in rewarding CHIS. Disclosure of this information would enlighten members of the public as to the number of CHIS being funded within their police area. This will promote better transparency and accountability where expenditure of public funds is concerned.
The purpose of the Act is to make public authorities more accountable and this factor, therefore, may be applied to a wide range of scenarios from how an individual or the force fulfils their role or function, to policy decisions that have been taken in relation to investigations or general policy issues. In this instance, disclosure allows public scrutiny of specific information relating to CHIS and how forces use this resource within their investigative processes.
Sec 38 - Considerations favouring non-disclosure
There may be occasions where the release of information relating to public safety may not be in the public interest.  Public safety is of paramount importance to the policing purpose and must be considered in respect of every release. In this instance it is likely that particular individuals would be placed at risk if their identities were to become public knowledge. Release of this information may also adversely affect wider public safety if the criminal fraternity/less law abiding individuals are provided with a tactical advantage over the Constabulary.
Criminal investigations and trials are likely to be undermined by any decrease in the use of informants, therefore allowing public safety to be at risk in not removing hardened criminals from the streets.
Loss of confidence - Release of information would act as a deterrent to the public to provide information to the force. There is a need to protect the flow of information from informants and the public, to allow all to have confidence that their information will be treated sensitively and appropriately. If the relationship between the force and members of the public/CHIS were impeded, the gathering of information to enable the force to perform its public service functions would become increasingly difficult.  The use of informants takes place in an environment of absolute trust and confidence.  Anything which undermines this ethos would have a detrimental effect, reducing the quality of information the service receives.
Unnecessary expenditure of public funds in providing long term witness protection if CHIS subsequently identified through the release of this information and their life subsequently placed at risk.
Sec 40
Section 40 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to carry out a public interest test.  It is absolute under Section 40(2) if disclosure would breach any of the data protection principles.  An informant provides information solely on the grounds that it is completely confidential; disclosure of information which identifies them could adversely affect the reputation of an individual with dangerous consequences.   In this case clearly the first principle ‘fairness and lawfully processed’ would be breached by disclosure.
Balancing Test
While accountability is a strong factor, the police service and law enforcement agencies are already subject to scrutiny and full oversight by the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner. All police forces are subject to regular inspections by this body, which is adept at identifying cases where an inappropriate use of a CHIS has occurred.
On balance, if disclosed, there could be the likelihood that the future law enforcement role of the force could be compromised and the safety of individuals and the public put at risk.  It cannot be justified that the public's interest would be served in releasing this specific information if either of these aspects were to be compromised in any way
In addition to the above response this notice also acts as a refusal under the provisions of Sec17 (1) of the Freedom of information Act 2000 in that I can neither confirm nor deny that any additional information is held, by this force, by virtue of Sec 23(5) (Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters) and Sec 24(2) National Security.
Again I am obliged to explain, without disclosing exempt information, why I am relying on these exemptions and cannot confirm nor deny the existence of such information.
Evidence of Harm:
CHIS may be used by the police to combat terrorism and/or serious crime. In pursuit of these objectives, the police service works in partnership with other agencies, and as information may sometimes be provided by or relate to bodies listed at section 23(3) of the Act.

A full explanation of this can be found at:
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/s23_security_bodies_v1_fop097.pdf

In addition to forces rewarding CHIS from their annual budget for straightforward criminal investigations there is also provision for partner agencies to sometimes provide additional funds in order to deal with terrorism and national security matters. This partnership approach to gathering sensitive information has been publically acknowledged through published documents such as the HMIC Thematic report entitled ‘A Need to Know’
To confirm or deny that such information may or may be held by this force will enable a simple mapping exercise of the United Kingdom to be completed revealing areas of activity by these bodies. This information would have a major impact on national security and also place operations and individuals at risk.

Sections 23 and 24.
Section 23(5) is an absolute exemption and does not require the public interest to be considered.
Section 24(2) requires a public interest test in relation to confirmation or denial.

Factors favouring confirmation or denial for S24 – Confirmation or denial as to whether national security related information is held would not increase the risk of identification. The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent.

Factors against confirmation or denial for S24 – By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
To confirm or deny whether [insert force name] hold any additional information would allow inferences to be made about the nature and extent of national security related activities which may or may not take place in a given area. This could enable terrorist groups to take steps to avoid detection, and as such, confirmation or denial would be damaging to national security

This response should not be taken as confirmation nor denial that South Yorkshire Police did or did not receive such funding specified by your request, and no inference of such can be drawn.